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INTRODUCTION
For good and for bad, most sports, including all Olympic sports, are
divided into two categories, men's and women's. In some ways, this division
makes good sense. It ensures that female athletes have opportunities to
compete which might not exist if competitive sports were open on a gender
1
blind basis. But at the same time, it is problematic to impose a binary division

·Western New England University School of Law
1. See infra Part IV.B. Women are not categorically athletically inferior, but there are
both socially constructed as well as biological differences between men and women that
influence athletic outcomes. Women's historical exclusion from sport and the strained
relationship between athleticism and femininity have and continue to suppress women's
athletic interests and abilities. In addition, women are generally (though not categorically)
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on human beings who are far more diverse than the assumptions behind the
2
labels "male" and "female". Some who self-identify as female have, as a
result of an intersex condition, chromosomal and hormone characteristics that
are not typical of most women. Some (transgender women) who self-identify
as female were born with bodies that society regards as male, which they may
or may not have elected to modify in a gender-conforming way. Some
(transgender men and other transgender individuals) self-identify as
something other than female, but claim eligibility in women's sports by virtue
of having been born into a typical female body. For decades, sport organizers
have struggled to include intersex and transgender athletes within the binary
3
structure of sport. Exclusion of athletes who in some way lack gender-typical
characteristics has not only been painful for the affected athletes, but has
served to erase and symbolically marginalize all individuals who are different
by virtue of their intersex or transgender status.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), often in concert with the
international federation for track and field, has experimented with various
criteria for determining eligibility for women's sports, including physical
appearance and chromosome testing. 4 Separately, the IOC had endorsed a
separate policy for transgender athletes that allowed transgender women to
compete upon completion of a three prong transition that included surgery,
hormone treatment, and legal recognition of the athlete's female status. 5 But
when these efforts failed to produce fair and satisfying results for both
intersex and transgender athletes, the IOC and IAAF endorsed a hormone test
for women, one that first applied to women with hyperandrogenism, a
characteristic of some intersex conditions that results in the body's natural
production of testosterone at levels higher than that of typical women. Even
as this rule was challenged and temporarily suspended, the IOC recently
endorsed applying the same hormone level cutoff to determining the eligibility
of transgender women. In other words, the IOC is pushing for a hormone rule
that is uniform, in the sense that the same testosterone criterion would apply
to both intersex and transgender women.
This Article will first present a concise history of gender testing in
Olympic and international sport to illustrate why past attempts to define
eligibility for women's sports have proven unfair to women with intersex
6
conditions. It will then describe the shortcomings in the IOC's first effort in
2003 to articulate standard of eligibility for transgender athletes. In its second
Part, this Article will explain the IOC and IAAF's more recent efforts to define

disadvantaged in terms of the physical characteristics we associate with athleticism (and
have constructed concept of athleticism to showcase).
2. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUALITY 3 (2000) ("The body's sex is simply too complex. There is no either/or. Rather,
there are shades of difference").
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part l.B.
6. See infra Part I.
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eligibility for women's sports solely on the basis of testosterone. As applied to
hyperandrogenism, that effort has been temporarily suspended by the Court
of Arbitration for Sport, but, as Part Ill explains, on grounds that could permit
the rule's reinstatement if a stronger justification is presented by the IAAF.
Finally, this Article will critically evaluate the concept of a unified hormone
rule that the IOC appears to propose. After considering the strengths and
weakness of alternatives to such a rule-including genderless sports and a
uniform gender identity rule-this Article proposes a hybrid rule that applies a
hormone standard to transgender athletes but a gender identity standard for
7
women. Importantly, this final Part seeks to rationalize the different
treatment of transgender and intersex women in ways that minimize the
potential for such a rule to contribute negatively to society's understanding of
8
both gender and athletic fairness.
I. WHO IS FEMALE IN OLYMPIC AND INTERNATIONAL SPORT? A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Women could not attend, let alone participate, in the ancient Olympic
9
Games. According to mythology, one woman named Kallipatiera, defied the
ban and risked punishment of death by disguising herself as a male trainer in
10
order to watch her son compete. But when she lost her disguise, her identity
was revealed. Only goodwill for her family, which had produced many Olympic
champions, prevented her from being executed. So instead, from then on, all
trainers had to attend in the nude. Some have called the fallout from
11
Kallipateira's transgression the first Olympic policy of sex verification.
In modern times, women are no longer categorically excluded from
participation in the Olympic Games. But like their ancient counterparts,
contemporary sport organizations have struggled to identify who is female.
This Part will first examine the historic sex-verification practices that, while
attempting to address the Kallipetiera problem in reverse, i.e., men
masquerading as women in order to participate in women's events, ended up
causing unwarranted exclusion of women with atypical gender characteristics.
This Part will next describe the IOC's first effort to determine criteria to govern
participation by transgender athletes in sports consistent with their gender
identities.
A. A History of Sex Verification Testing

For the modern Olympic Games, sex verification was first proposed at the
1936 Olympics by United States coach and future IOC president Avery
Brundage, who urged Olympic organizers to systematically test the sex of

7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.B-D.
9. Laura A. Wackwitz, Verifying the Myth: Olympic Sex Testing and the Category
"Woman", 26 INT'L WOMEN'S STUDIES FORUM, 553, 553 (2003).
10. Id.; see also JAIME SCHULTZ, QUALIFYING TIMES: POINTS OF CHANGE IN WOMEN'S SPORTS 104
(2014).
11. Wackwitz, supra note 9, at 553.

32

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 31:1

12

female athletes in order to root out gender fraud.
Brundage's concern was
based on two examples of former athletes who had competed as women
before physically and socially transitioning to male, Mark (born Mary) Weston,
a British shotputter, and Zdenek Koubkov (born Zdenka Koubkova) a Czech
13
runner.
We now understand these athletes likely had an intersex condition
that caused them to have been initially been assigned female sex based on
14
ambiguous genitalia or misleading genitalia.
But Brundage considered these
now-male athletes' past participation as women as evidence of a threat of
fraud.
Separately from Brundage's proposal, the same 1936 Olympics also gave
rise to other incidents that have been interpreted (or misinterpreted) as
gender fraud. One involved "Dora" Ratjen, who placed fourth in the women's
shotput. Later, Ratjen revealed that he was actually a former Hitler Youth
member named Herman who disguised himself as a female to compete "for
15
the honor and glory of Germany" -though there is some evidence to suggest
it was "gender confusion" rather than fraud that caused Ratjen to be
16
misclassified.
A second incident involved American runner Helen Stephens,
gold medalist in the 100 meter event, who was accused of gender fraud by
silver medalist Stella Walsh or someone else from the Polish delegation acting
on Walsh's behalf. Rumors that Stephens was "really a man" resulted in
Olympic organizers subjecting Stephens to visual inspection to verify her
femininity. While Stephens passed the inspection, it was Walsh who would
17
eventually "join Ratjen in the canon of gender frauds" as it was revealed
after her death in 1980 that the majority of her body's cells had the XV
chromosome pattern typical of men. 18
Brundage did eventually get his way, as sex verification became routine
19
for the Olympics and other international competitions. For a brief time, sport
federations sought to verify the sex of female competitors by the same
method that the Ancient Greeks used-nudity. But the so-called "nude

12. SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 106.
13. Vanessa Heggie, Testing Sex and Gender in Sports: Reinventing, Reimagining and
Reconstructing Histories, 34 Endeavor 157, 158-59 (2010).
14. The examples of these athletes remind us that it is possible for an individual to be
both transgender and intersex. Just like anyone else, an intersex person has a gender
identity, and if this gender identity does not match the sex assigned at birth, they may
undergo a physical transition utilizing hormones or surgery to harmonize their bodies with
their gender identities. The fact of these intersex individuals' transition, however, may
have contributed to the misperception that an intersex woman in not really a woman.
Conflation of transgender and intersex also may explain the retrospective scrutiny of
transgender athletes' participation in their birth-sex category prior to transition, such as
misguided claims that Caitlyn Jenner should be stripped of gold medals she won as Bruce.
15. SHULTZ, supra note 10, at 107.
16. Heggie, supra note 13, at 157, 163.
17. Id. at 157-58.
18. Mosaicism is when cells in the same body have different geneotypes. Walsh
apparently had a XV/XO mosaicism.
19. Heggie, supra note 13; SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 108-18.

2016]

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

33

20

parades" of the Cold War era gave way to a seemingly more scientific
21
The Barr body is the inactive, second X
method, the Barr body test.
chromosome found in the cells of women with the typical female XX
genotype. From 1968 until 1998, Olympic organizers and other international
sport bodies required all female competitors to submit a cell sample that
could be inspected for presence of the Barr body.
Typical males have an XV genotype and thus no second, inactive X.
Therefore, a Barr body test would theoretically be effective at screening men
seeking to masquerade as women, though no such men were ever caught this
way. On the other hand, a Barr body test was completely ineffective at
screening for what was then a genuine threat in women's sports: illegal
doping with anabolic steroids and exogenous testosterone as practiced by East
22
Germany and other Communist-bloc countries. Instead, the Barr body test
caused problems for women with intersex conditions. lntersex, also known as
differences of sexual development (DSDs), categorically refers to a range of
conditions in which a body's reproductive or sexual anatomy is not typically
23
For example, individuals with Androgen Insensitivity
male or female.
Syndrome have XV chromosomes and consequently, bodies that produce male
hormones (androgens). But due to a chromosomal anomaly that prevents or
limits the body's ability to use these hormones, individuals with AIS are
24
In 1986, Spanish hurdler Maria Jose Martinez Patino
physiologically female.
was excluded from international competition after she failed a Barr body
25
test. Officials suggested that she fake an injury to avoid the embarrassing
26
disclosure of the real reason or her disqualification. But Martinez Patino did
not leave sport quietly; instead, she publically challenged her disqualification
and eventually succeeded when the IAAF admitted that her condition resulted

20. SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 108 (noting speculation that the certain Soviet and
Romanian female athletes opted out of the 1966 World Championships out of fear that
they would not have "passed" a visual inspection); Robert Ritchie et al., lntersex and the
Olympic Games, 101 J. OF THE ROYAL Soc'y OF MED. 395, 396-97 (2008).
21. Ritchie et al., supra note 21.
22. Werner W. Franke & Brigitte Berendonk, Hormonal Doping and Androgenization
of Athletes: A Secret Program of the German Democratic Republic Government, 43 CLINICAL
CHEMISTRY 1262, 1265 (1997).
lntersex?,
Is
What
America,
North
of
Society
lntersex
23.
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited June 22, 2016).
24. Alice Dreger, Sex Typing for Sport, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22, 23 (2010) (Specifically,
an individual with AIS starts to develop as a typical male fetus, and thus lack a uterus,
fallopian tubes, cervix, and the upper part of the vagina. However, because cells fail to
respond to testosterone, the body does not create male genitalia, so external genitalia is
female by default. AIS women's body continue to feminize during puberty (though they do
not menstruate); see lntersex Society of North America, supra note 23 ("AIS individuals are
clearly women").
25. SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 113.
26. Id.
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in no competitive advantage.
By then, however, she was past her athletic
prime and failed to qualify for the next Olympic games. 28
Individuals with other chromosomal differences could also confound the
Barr body test. A woman with Turner's syndrome who is missing a second X
chromosome would be excluded, while a man with Klinefelter's syndrome,
29
who is XXY, would not be. Mosaicism complicates matters even further. 30
For example, a Polish sprinter named Ewa Klobukowska was eventually
excluded from women's sports after some other method of chromosome test
revealed her to have some cells that are XX and others that are XXY. 31
Notably, however, she initially passed the Barr body test since all of her cells
32
have a second X chromosome.
In 1992, the IAAF decided to end its practice of systematic sex testing 33
while still affirming its right to disqualify female athletes in cases where
"suspicion is raised." The IOC eventually followed suit in 1999 after its failed
attempt to improve the method of sex testing by replacing Barr body test with
a test that identified the presence of a second Y chromosome. 34 Eight women
who failed this test in 1996 were initially excluded from the Atlanta games. 35
However, they were all reinstated upon further examination. After that, the
IOC abandoned systematic testing and moved to a suspicion-based model. 36

B. The Stockholm Consensus: IOC's First Transgender Policy
As the history of sex verification testing suggests, the IOC and
international sport federations have struggled to impose a binary classification
system against the reality that human beings are more diverse than male and
female categories can attest. Eventually, they would attempt to address a
second challenge to the binary system in sport, one that is posed by
37
transgender athletes. Unlike intersex individuals, transgender individuals are
born with typical male or female physical characteristics. Yet their internal
sense of being male or female, that is, their gender identity, does not match
those physical traits. Some transgender individuals do not identify as either
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Katrina Karkazis et al., Out of Bounds: A Critique of the New Policies on
Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes, 12 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 3, 7 (2012).
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. EILEEN MCDONAGH AND LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE Is NOT
EQUAL IN SPORTS 42 (2008) ..
32. Id. at 42.
33. ANAIS BOUHON & EVA RODRIGUEZ, GENDER TESTING IN SPORT: ETHICS, CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES 27, 30 (Sandy Montanola & Aurelie Olivesi eds., 2016).
34. Id.
35. Myron Genel, Gender Verification No More, 5 Os/GYN & WOMEN'S HEALTH 3 (2000),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/408918.
36. Sheila L. Cavanagh & Heather Sykes, Transsexual Bodies at the Olympics: The
International Olympic Committee's Policy on Transsexual Athletes at the 2004 Athens
Summer Games, 12 BODY & SOCIETY 75, 76 (2006).
37. (Unless they are also intersex)
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male or female, while others identify with the gender category other than the
one they were assigned at birth. To validate transgender identities is to
understand that one's gender classification is not necessarily limited to binary
categories and that it is more complicated than one's physical characteristics
at birth.
In 2003, a committee of the International Olympic Committee's Medical
Commission meeting in Stockholm, adopted a statement governing athletic
38
The so-called Stockholm Consensus,
participation by transgender athletes.
which was adopted by the IOC in 2004, recognized that a transgender athlete
wishing to compete according to their gender identity rather than their birth
sex could do so as long as they had transitioned physically and legally.
Specifically, the IOC imposed three requirements. First, the athlete must have
completed "surgical anatomical changes" including "external genital changes
39
and gonadectomy." Second, the athlete's gender must be legally recognized
40
Third, the athlete must have received
by "appropriate official authorities."
of time to minimize gender-related
length
sufficient
a
hormone therapy "for
the committee recognized as a
which
competition,"
advantages in sports
41
minimum of two years.
The Stockholm Consensus was groundbreaking in its recognition of
transgender athletes and validation of their right to compete according to
their gender identities. Yet, the specific requirements and limitations it
imposed have been criticized on two main grounds. First, the policy seems to
be concerned only about the transition of transgender women, as there is no
discernable reason to require a transgender man to have "genital surgery,
including gonadectory" in order to fairly compete as a man. Nor does it make
sense to require that they "minimize gender-related advantages" with cross
sex hormones (i.e., testosterone) given the perception of testosterone's
42
contribution to athletic advantage. The fact that this purportedly general
policy only makes sense when applied to transgender women belies its
drafters' biased assumption of the athletic inferiority of natal females. Such a
bias would explain why the policy in practice only regulated transgender
athletes in women's sports, and why drafters seemingly ignored the possibility
43
of a transitioned natal women seeking to compete in men's sports.
A second criticism of the Stockholm Consensus is that it imposes
transition requirements on transgender women that are devoid of athletic

38. International Olympic Committee, Final Statement on the Stockholm Consensus
2003),
28,
(Oct.
Sports,
in
Reassignment
Sex
on
https ://sti II med.olym pie. org/med ia/Docu ment%20Li bra ry /0 lym pic0rg/News/20040S 17_IO
C_Approves_Consensus_With_Regard_To_Athletes_Who_Have_Cha nged_Sex/EN_report_
905.pdf#_ga=l.73057811.1205785059.1466649418.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Claire F. Sullivan, Gender Verification and Gender Policies in Elite Sport: Eligibility
and "Fair Play,,, 35 J. OF SPORT AND Soc. ISSUES 400, 409 (2011).
43. Cavanagh & Sykes, supra note 36, at 78.
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rationale, and that appear to exist more for purpose of catching imaginary
masqueraders. Genital surgery does not cause any physical changes to the
44
body that cannot be achieved by hormone requirements alone.
Because of
this redundancy, the only plausible purpose for a surgery requirement is to
impose a sincerity test to weed out men who may be willing to perpetrate
gender fraud by taking hormones for several years, but would presumably
stop short of permanent removal of their genitals. In similar vein, the
requirement to legally change one's sex bears no relation to athletic ability.
With little evidence to suggest that masquerading men pose a threat to
women's sports, the only real effect of these requirements is to exclude
potential transgender competitors who hail from countries that refuse to
legally recognize their affirmed genders and those who cannot access or do
45
not desire surgical intervention.
These unnecessary restrictions may
contribute to the fact that despite the adoption of the Stockholm Consensus
by many international sport federations and the passage of more than ten
years, no transgender athletes have competed in the Olympics pursuant to
this policy.
II. IOC's TURN TOWARD HORMONE-BASED ELIGIBILITY
The most recent gender-related policies of the IOC and the IAAF no
longer target the imaginary problem of men pretending to be women, but
purportedly impose fairness in women's sports by excluding athletes whose
status as female is not in question, but who are by virtue of their intersex or
transgender status believed to compete with athletic advantage. Specifically,
the IOC is urging sport federations to adopt a hormone-based rule that will
define eligibility for women's sport. Transgender and intersex women alike
would be excluded from participation on the basis of elevated levels of
endogenous testosterone.
A. Hyperandrogenism Rule for lntersex Athletes

In 2013, the IOC adopted the Hyperandrogenism Rule, which excludes
women from participation if suspicion-based testing reveals endogenous
testosterone levels of 10 nanomols per liter of serum, a number associated
46
with the "normal male range." The IOC based its policy on that of the IAAF,
47
which had adopted the same cutoff in 2011 in response to public criticism of
its handing of questions of eligibility surrounding South African runner Caster

44. Pat Griffin & Helen Carroll, On the Team: Equal Opportunities for Transgender
Student Athletes, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION (2010),
http://www.wiaa .com/Con Docs/Co nSSO/Tra nsgende rStude ntAthleteReport. pdf.
45. Sullivan, supra note 42, at 408-09.
46.
IOC
Regulations
on
Female
Hyperandrogenism
(2012),
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2012
06-22-IOC-Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf.

47. IAAF Regulations Governing Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism
to Compete in Women's Competition (Apr. 12, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/IAAF-HA-reg.

2016)

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

37

Semenya. In response to rumors of gender fraud that plagued Semenya
following her victory in the in the 800 meter event at the 2009 World
Championships in Berlin, the IAAF subjected her to a gender-verification
48
process conducted by an expert panel. Though the results of the testing
were not officially disclosed, the media reported that Semenya's blood "had
49
three times the normal female level of testosterone," evidence of a possible .
intersex condition such as (perhaps) AIS that results in hyperandrogenism
(high levels of male sex hormones, androgens) in women. Unfortunately, this
disclosure provoked ugly public criticism of Semenya that persisted even as
the IAAF refused to revoke her gold medal and cleared her to run in future
50
The story also called to mind the plight of a similarly-situated
events.
runner, Indian Santhi Soundaranjan, whom the IAAF disqualified from
women's sport in 2006 after a similar, suspicion-based gender inquest
revealed her hyperandrogenism. This discovery had deleterious effects on
Soundaranjan's life that extended far beyond sport; she was shunned as an
51
outcast and even attempted suicide.
Soundaranjan and Semenya's cases revealed that the IAAF's then-extant
policy of allowing an expert committee to verify a female athlete's gender
without articulating criteria for that committee to apply, was not only cruel to
the athletes who were scrutinized this way, but also undermined confidence
in the fairness of women's events governed by the IAAF. So in 2011, the IAAF
responded to these events by supplying a hyperandrogenism rule, which
provided a bright-line test for eligibility in cases where a female athlete's
52
gender was called into question. The IAAF insists that its new rule does not
determine who counts as female, but simply operates as a rule of eligibility for
women's sports. Nevertheless, the federation chose as its eligibility criterion a
natural testosterone level below 10 nmol/L -a cutoff that defines female
53
athletes' eligibility in contrast to "the normal male range."
Under the IAAF's hyperandrogenism rule (which was adopted by the IOC
54
in 2012) a female athlete whose testosterone level is higher than 10 nmol/L
48. Cheryl Cooky et al., "What Makes a Woman a Woman?" Versus "Our First Lady of
Sport": A Comparative Analysis of the United States and the South African Media Coverage
of Caster Semenya, 37 J. OF SPORT AND Soc. ISSUES 31, 39 (2013).
49. Simon Hart, World Athletics: Caster Semenya tests 'Show High Testosterone
2009),
24,
(Aug.
TELEGRAPH
Levels,'
http://www.telegraph .co. uk/sport/othersports/ath letics/6078171/World-Ath letics-Caster
Seme nya-tests-show-high-testosterone-levels. html.
SO. Cooky et al., supra note 48, at 38-40.
Semenya 'Must Not be Humiliated,' BBC Sports (Sept. 11, 2009),
Sl.
http://news. bbc. co. uk/sport2/h i/ath Ieti cs/82S0469 .stm.
S2. Francisco J. Sanchez et al., The New Policy on Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female
112 (2013),
Athletes is not about "Sex Testing," SO J. OF SEX RES.
http://www.ncbi .nlm .nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3SS48S7/.
S3. International Association of Athletic Federations, IAAF Regulations Governing
Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women's Competition
(Apr. 12, 2011), http:ljtinyurl.com/IAAF-HA-reg [hereinafter IAAF Regulations].
S4. International Olympic Committee, IOC Regulations on Female Hyperandrogenism
2012),
22,
(June
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may only compete if she undertakes medical treatment to suppress the effect
5
of testosterone in her body5 , or if she proves that her body is insensitive to
56
androgen. This exception for insensitivity recognizes the reality that many
women's hyperandrogenism is, like in the case of Maria Patino-Martinez, the
result of androgen insensitivity syndrome, which produces male hormones
that the body is fully or at least partially incapable of using. (Interestingly,
Patino-Martinez, now a professor, helped develop the hyperandrogensim rule
and would later help defend it against the legal challenge that is discussed in
57
the next Part).

B. New Hormone-Based Guidelines for Transgender Athletes
Notwithstanding an athlete's partially successful challenge to the
hyperandrogenism rule (which is discussed more fully in the next part), the
IOC recently expanded the potential scope of this hormone-based rule to
govern transgender women as well. 58 In 2015 the IOC updated its earlier
Stockholm Consensus with new guidelines urging sport federations to permit
transgender women to compete in female categories as long as they have
59
satisfied two conditions: First, she must declare that her gender identity is
female, a declaration that must remain consistent for at least four years.
Second, she must demonstrate that her testosterone level has been below 10
nmol/L for at least twelve months prior to competition and that her
testosterone level remains below that threshold throughout the period of her
desired eligibility. The first requirement, that the athlete self-declare her
female gender identity, signals the IOC's understanding that gender identity is
an important factor in determining one's eligibility for women's sports.
Moreover, the fact that the new policy requires her to self-declare her gender
identity (rather than have it "verified" through surgery or a legal change)
replaces the earlier policy's presumption of fraud with a presumption of
legitimacy. The second requirement, to reduce one's testosterone levels to
below the normal male range, apparently seeks to impose a consistent
eligibility requirement within women's sports. The IOC's new transgender
http://www.olympic.org/Docu me nt5/Com m i5sions _PD Ffiles/M ed ica I_commission/2012
06-22-10C-Regulations-on-Fe ma le-Hypera nd rogen ism-eng. pdf.
55. IAAF Regulations, supra note 53, at 13 (permitting an athlete to return to
competition if she satisfies the eligibility panel's requirements for medical treatment); Silvia
Camporesi & Paolo Maugeri, Unfair Advantage and the Myth of the Level Playing Field in
IAAF and IC Policies on Hyperandrogenism, GENDER TESTING IN SPORT, 46, 48 (referring to such
medical treatment as "androgen-suppressive therapy").
56. IAAF Regulations, supra note 53, at 12.
57. See Sanchez et al., supra note 52 (noting that Patino-Martinez is a co-author);
Chand v. Athletics Fed'n of India & Int'/ Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns, CAS 2014/A/3759 1111 319
325 (CAS July 24, 2015).
58. International Olympic Committee, IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment
and
Hyperandragenism
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.olym pie. org/Docu me nts/Com missions_PD Ffiles/M edi ca I_comm issi o n/2015
1l_ioc_consensus _meeting_ on_sex_reassign ment_and_hypera ndrogen ism-en. pdf.
59. Id.
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policy endorses the hyperandrogenism rule and expands its application so
that all women (both transgender women and non-transgender women) are
eligible as long as they do not have testosterone levels above 10 nmol/L.
Additionally, the new guidelines expressly recognize transgender men,
affirming that there are no restrictions on transgender men seeking to
60
compete in men's sports.
Ill. CHALLENGING THE HYPERANDROGENISM RULE: CHAND V. IAAF
According to the IAAF, its hyperandrogenism rule sets a generous upper
limit for women's natural testosterone levels, since the cutoff of 10 nmol/L of
testosterone is more than three standard deviations from the mean natural
61
levels of women's testosterone. Theoretically, therefore, the rule would
rarely operate to exclude female athletes, since less than 0.01 percent of the
female population would be affected by such a rule. Nevertheless, several
reported exclusions occurred during the first three years of the policy's
62
effect. In 2014, the IAAF excluded an Indian sprinter named Dutee Chand
when her testosterone levels (unreported) apparently exceeded the rule.
Chand, in turn, chose to challenge the rule in the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, the tribunal with jurisdiction to settle disputes involving international
sport federations. Last summer, the CAS announced its decision in Chand's
case, delivering a partial victory by temporarily suspending the IAAF's
hyperandrogenism rule. This Part will first describe the CAS's decision,
including the narrow grounds on which the court suspended the rule, while
leaving open the possibility of its reinstatement. It then presents criticism of
CAS's endorsement of the IAAF's strained and understandings of gender,
athleticism, and fairness.

A. CAS Ruling in Chand v. IAAF
In Chand v. IAAF, the Court of Arbitration for Sport suspended the IAAF's
hyperandrogenism rule, but did so on narrow grounds that permit IAAF to
demonstrate a stronger scientific basis to support the premise that
hyperandrogenic women have a competitive advantage over non
hyperandrogenic women. If the federation can make this showing in two
years, CAS will reinstate the rule.
Under the legal standard that the CAS employed, the fact that the
hyperandrogenism rule is discriminatory on its face - because it does not
impose an upper limit on men's testosterone - shifted the burden to the IAAF
to show that the exclusion of HA women is "necessary, reasonable and
proportionate for the purposes of establishing a level playing field for female

60. Id.
61. Sanchez et al., supra note 52; Chand, 2014/A/357 ~ 308.
62. Silvia Camporesi & Paolo Maugeri, supra note 55, at 46, 55 (noting that, besides
Dutee Chand, four other female athletes with testosterone levels higher than 10 nmol/L
were targeted by the policy).
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63

athletes." The CAS determined that IAAF had not met its scientific burden of
proof on this issue. While it was convinced that hyperandrogenic women
64
have a competitive advantage of some kind, the IAAF did not meet its
burden of establishing that such competitive advantage was of sufficient
degree to warrant the exclusion of women with testosterone levels higher
65
than 10 nmol/L.
In contrast, CAS reasoned that the justification for having separate male
and female categories in the first place is justified by evidence of a purported
"10-12% difference in athletic performances between elite male and elite
66
female athletes," a finding that was not in dispute in the Chand case.
Yet,
CAS noted that there was no evidence to suggest that hyperandrogenic
woman's advantage over typical female athletes is of a similar magnitude.
After all, testosterone is just one piece of a "complex neuroendrocrine
feedback system" that affects a body's athletic capability. 67 So there is no
basis to assume that a testosterone level of lOnmol/L affects women in the
same way it affects men - in fact, this seems unlikely as we already know that
hyperandrogenic women vary in their response to testosterone that their
68
bodies produce. While the CAS did not tell IAAF what percentage difference
in athletic performance between hyperandrogenic women excluded by the
rule and other female athletes would be acceptable, it did suggest that a slight
advantage such as 1% "may not justify a separation of athletes within the
female category, given other relevant variables that legitimately affect athletic
69
performance." With that, the CAS suspended the rules for two years,
permitting the IAAF to seek the rule's reinstatement within that time frame by
supplementing the evidence about hyperandrogenic women's competitive
advantage. Meanwhile, Dutee Chand is eligible to compete in women's track
events.
B. CAS Endorses Testosterone-Based Boundaries In Women's Sports

While the decision serves as a short-term victory for Dutee Chand, it is
important to note that the CAS disagreed with most of her case. Centrally, the
CAS endorsed, in principle, that the IMF may use endogenous testosterone as
the means of policing the boundaries of women's sport. In so doing, it

63. Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~~ 118, 450.
64. Hyperandrogenic women are overrepresented among elite female athletes, a
fact the CA5 was willing to credit as indirect evidence of an advantage. Chand,
2014/A/3759, ~~ 523, 524. But see, Karkazis, supra note 29; Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~ 123
(noting that hyperadrogenic women who are insensitive to testosterone are
overrepresented among athletes, casting doubt on the causal relationship between
testosterone and competitive advantage).
65. Chand, 2014/A/3759, ~~ 522, 524.
66. Id. ~ 522.
67. Karkazis, supra note 29, at 8. This occurs specifically, by promoting lean body
mass, a physical characteristic demonstrably associated with athleticism.
68. Karkazis, supra note 29.
69. Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~ 527.
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rejected two arguments presented by Chand's experts: (1) that endogenous
testosterone does not explain the difference between male and female
athletic performance; and (2) that there is no convincing evidence that
endogenous testosterone enhances athletic performance in female athletes.
The experts pointed out that the high variability among women's endogenous
testosterone levels does not correspond to a similar degree of variability in
athletic performance. Testosterone levels among women in the "normal"
female range vary widely, including for example, both .1 nmol/L and 3
70
nmol/L. That is a 30-fold difference, yet the difference does not translate to
30-fold, or even measurable, difference in athletic performance. Similarly, the
ten-fold difference between average female and average male levels of
endogenous testosterone not only fails to correspond to a ten-fold difference
in athletic ability between men and women, it fails to explain that even among
71
The
elite athletes, male and female performance levels often overlap.
presumed correlation between women's testosterone levels and athletic
performance is also challenged by fact that female athletes who use hormonal
contraceptives, which lower the body's androgen levels, do so without
72
Additionally, women whose
measured effect on athletic performance.
bodies are completely insensitive to testosterone (complete androgen
insensitivity syndrome, an intersex condition) are actually overrepresented
among elite female athletes, a fact that further confounds the perceived
73
Moreover, the fact
correlation between testosterone and athletic ability.
that 16.5% of elite male athletes are competitive in their sports despite having
endogenous testosterone levels below 8 nmol/L (i.e., within the permissible
range for female athletes competing in women's sports) casts even more
doubt on the relationship between endogenous testosterone and athletic
performance.
The CAS, however, was persuaded that endogenous testosterone is a
material contributing factor to athletic performance, basing this on
74
observations stemming from male puberty and from doping. Male puberty
produces an increase in endogenous testosterone, which contributes to the
development of lean body mass, a known correlate to athletic strength
(Relatedly, surgically or pharmacologically curtailing a male body's natural
75
Doping with exogenous
testosterone will reduce lean body mass.).
testosterone is also well known to enhance athletes' athletic performance.
70. Karkazis, supra note 29, at 4.
71. Karkazis, supra note 29 at 8. Testosterone levels are not only highly variable
among individuals, but within individuals as well. Participating in and even watching athletic
events can elevate an individual's endogenous testosterone. Athleticism may to some
extent be the cause of high testosterone levels instead as much the result. Chand,
2014/A/3759 ~ 165; Karkazis, supra note 29, at 8.
72. Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~ 123.
73. Id. Similarly counterintuitive is the fact that, women with Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (a condition that produces high levels of usable endogenous testosterone) are
long-shots for athletic success. Karkazis, supra note 29, at 8.
74. Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~ 454-499.
75. Id. ~ 133.
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However, CAS seemed willing to accept, without proof, that female bodies and
male bodies respond to testosterone the same way, and that a body's natural
levels of testosterone will have the same or similar effect as hormone that is
introduced into the body. To that last point, Chand's experts argued that
doping with exogenous testosterone introduces a new biochemical agent that
upsets the body's equilibrium and natural stasis, while endogenous
76
testosterone does not. For this reason, exogenous testosterone may trigger
the body's production of more androgen receptors (i.e., the body's ability to
77
use testosterone) in ways that endogenous testosterone may not.
The CAS not only accepted the IAAF's scientific rationale for pursuing a
testosterone-based rule, it also failed to scrutinize the federation's singling out
women for its application. If athletes with higher than average levels of
testosterone compete at an advantage over other members of their sex, then
the resulting fairness problem would need to be addressed in men's athletics
as well as women's. Yet no such rule has ever been proposed or even studied.
The fact that the IAAF does not take its own argument to its logical end should
have made CAS more skeptical about it in the first place.

D. CAS Endorses Suspicion-Based Testing
When the IAAF and IOC curtailed the practice of routine sex verification
testing for female athletes in the 1990s, they permitted testing to occur on the
suspicion of gender fraud. The IAAF codified the practice of suspicion-based
testing in its hyperandrogenism regulations by empowering IAAF medical
officials to investigate an athlete's possible hyperandrogenism on the basis of
78
"reasonable grounds for believing" that the athlete has the condition. Such
grounds may include the athlete's own report, the results of other medical
evaluations of the athlete, a doping control result or anti-doping test, or
"information received" by the IAAF or other responsible medical officials. The
broad final category does not preclude an athlete's opponents from raising or
contributing to gender-based suspicion, as Caster Semenya's defeated
opponents did in the wake of her gold medal victor at the 2009 World
79
Championships. The CAS decision in Chand's case neither criticizes the
practice of suspicion-based testing nor cites it as grounds for suspending the
rule, even as Chand's experts pointed out the bias that results when the

76. Id. ~ 124.
77. Id.~~ 162, 171.
78. IAAF Regulation, supra note 53, at 2.2; Chand, 2014/A/3759 ~ 46.
79. While it is not known whether competitors or others originally reported suspicion
that resulted in Semenya's gender test, her competitors certainly contributed to the
suspicion as they spoke to the media immediately after the championship. See Cooky et al.,
supra note 48, at 39 ("Elisa Cusma, an Italian runner who finished sixth in the race said,
'These kind of people should not run with us. For me, she is not a woman. She is a man'.
Russian athlete, Mariya Savinova, who finished fifth, told Russian journalists that she did
not think Semenya would pass the gender-verification test stating, 'Just look at her."').
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dominant culture measures athletes against "subjective and stereotypical
80
notions of White femininity."
Suspicion-based testing also magnifies the dignity-harm that the
hyperandrogenism rule causes to athletes who are targeted under the rule. It
is difficult to accept the rule's purported objective of determining eligibility
rather than verifying gender, when the rule itself permits scrutiny of an
athlete on the basis of perceived noncompliance with gender norms. In this
way, the rule undermines athletes' dignity and self-determination by
subjecting to the scrutiny of others one of the most personal and deeply held
beliefs about oneself, the definition of one's own gender.
E. CAS Mythologizes the "Level Playing Field"
The CAS's decision in Chand's case, while temporarily suspending the
specific rule proposed by IAAF, endorsed the concept of a hyperadrogenism
rule for women's sports when it permitted the IAAF to justify the rule with
scientific evidence of hyperandrogenic women's competitive advantage over
other women. In so ruling, the CAS validates the questionable belief that
excluding gender outliers will, and is necessary, to make women's sports "fair"
for other competitors.
Chand and her experts tried to expose the illusory nature of the so-called
level playing field by pointing out numerous naturally-occurring physical traits
for which athletes are neither tested nor excluded, despite their association
with athletic advantage in various sports, including: increased hemoglobin
levels caused by defective EPO receptors, tallness (in some sports), shortness
(in others), low body mass index, unusually high lung capacity, mitochondrial
conditions that increase aerobic capacity, acromegaly (i.e. large hands and
feet), perfect vision, and unusually efficient systems for muscle growth and
81
The self-sorting nature of the elite athlete population increases
blood flow.
the likelihood that physical advantages like these are present in various
combinations. Yet despite the sporting world's tolerance for other aspects of
physical diversity, only women's endogenous testosterone is singled out as the
basis for exclusion. CAS's opinion provides no satisfying response to questions
its conclusion raises about how level the playing field is, hyperandrogensim
notwithstanding.
Moreover, sport federations have made no effort to level the playing
field based on other, non-biological factors that contribute athletic advantage.
For instance, the IOC does not separate Olympic events based on the size of
the country's population. Even the "medal count" is reported without regard
for inherent advantages that inure to countries with larger populations from
82
Financial resources and training conditions
which to draw athletic talent.

80. Chand, 2014/A/3759, ~ 225.
81. Id. ~~ 149, 260.
82. Matthew O'Brien, Medal-Count Economics: What Factors Explain the Olympics'
2012,
10,
Aug.
ATLANTIC,
THE
Winners?,
Biggest
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contribute hugely to an individual athlete's ability, yet "level playing field"
arguments are never waged against a field of competition that includes
athletes with varying degree of access to resources and opportunity.
Moreover, sports for which the level playing myth has been destroyed by
doping scandals continue to thrive. And while doping is surely distinguishable
from the natural sources of athletic advantage discussed here, it is hard to
insist that the level playing field is an essential attribute of sport when there
are still corporations willing to sponsor riders in the Tour de France and
83
broadcasters who find it profitable to cover.
In failing to push back on the IAAF's "level playing field" rationale for its
hyperandrogenism rule, CAS's opinion misses an opportunity to admit that
that the playing field in sport is inherently unequal, and moreover, that society
84
finds this acceptable.
The court failed to call out the IAAF for its singular
focus on a single source of perceived competitive advantage, that of
endogenous women's testosterone, to the exclusion of other factors. The
court failed to acknowledge that taken to its logical end, the pursuit of a level
playing field would produce a homogenous field of competitors and
homogenous performances.
In summary, the CAS decision should have demonstrated more
skepticism at the concept of a hyperandrogenism rule, rather than just the
narrow issue of whether science can support the degree of advantage
necessary to justify exclusion of women with testosterone higher than
10nmol/L. The decision fails to disturb two key myths-the myth of a
testosterone-based binary and the myth of a level playing field-which
operate at the heart of the hyperandrogenism rule. At the same time, it leaves
untouched the problematic practice of suspicion-based testing and the rules
harmful undermining of an athlete's autonomy around the very personal
matter of determining one's own gender.

http://www.the at la ntic.com/business/arch ive/2012/08/med a1-count-econom ics-what
factors-expla i n-the-olym pics-biggest-wi nners/260951/.
83. Wladimir Andreff, The Tour de France: A Success Story in Spite of Competitive
lmbalonce ond Doping, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL ROAD CYCLING 233, 234 (Daam van
Reeth & Daniel Joseph Larson, eds. 2016) ("Tour de France attendance and TV audience do
not seem to be seriously threatened and sure not definitely affected by doping scandals
either."). See also Jeffrey Cisyk & Pascal Courty, Do Fans Care About Compliance to Doping
Regulations in Sports? The Impact of PED Suspension in Baseball, J. OF SPORTS ECON. (2015)
(finding that reports of doping violations in professional baseball produce only a small and
temporary effect on home game attendance).
84. Cooky et al., supra note 48, at 51 ("Thus, rather than attempt to maintain the
myth of a level-playing field by sex testing athletes to ensure no one has an "unfair"
sex/gender "advantage," there should be a clear recognition and acceptance that sport is
not a level-playing field. This effectively eliminates the need to sex test athletes, male or
female, in the first place. This may be an effective route through which to begin to
transform sport and to assist with the eradication of sex, gender, race, and sexuality
injustice.").
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IV. MOVING FORWARD: RECONCILING OBJECTIONS TO HYPERANDROGENISM RULE WITH
IOC'S NEW HORMONE-BASED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSGENDER WOMEN

In the wake of CAS's decision, there is some uncertainty about the
approach IOC and international governing bodies like the IAAF will take to
regulating eligibility for women's sports. Presently, the hyperandrogenism rule
is temporarily suspended, and will not be reinstated unless the IAAF can
satisfy the court's requirement for more scientific evidence on the relationship
85
between testosterone and athletic advantage. For its part, the IOC has
86
encouraged the IAAF to keep fighting for its hyperandrogenism rule.
Presumably, if the IAAF prevails, then the IOC's proposal to use the same
testosterone standard to determine the eligibility of transgender women as
87
well will also have more traction.
This Part will examine the relative advantages and disadvantages of
applying the same hormone standard for determining the eligibility of
transgender and nontransgender women alike. It will then consider and
compare two alternatives: a gender identity rule and a hybrid rule that applies
a hormone standard to transgender women and gender identity standard to
non-transgender women.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Uniform Hormone Rule

The combination of a reinstated hyperandrogenism rule and the IOC's
proposed rule for transgender women amounts to a uniform hormone rule for
women's athletics: that any woman-transgender or cisgender-is eligible for
participation in women's sports as long as she has less than 10 nanomols of
testosterone in 1 liter of serum.
In some ways, what this article refers to as a "uniform" hormone rule
(meaning that it imposes the same eligibility requirements both on
transgender women and on cisgender women who may have
hyperadrogenism resulting from an intersex condition) would constitute a
progressive step. First, the uniformity of the rule imparts equal treatment on
transgender women by subjecting them to the exact same rules as other
women, which could signal sport's acceptance of them as "real" women.
Second, the unified hormone rule consistently maintains the focus on
88
eligibility and fairness and minimizes the focus on fraud and verification that
85. See Part Ill.A, supra.
86. In a statement accompanying the new recommendations for transgender
women, the IOC expressly encourages the IAAF to "revert to CAS with arguments and
evidence to support the reinstatement of its hyperandrogenism rules." IOC Consensus
Meeting, supra note 59.
87. See Part 11.B supra.
88. I deliberate say "minimize" rather than "eliminate" because the IOC's
requirement that a transgender woman consistently assert a female gender identity for
four years prior to competition is probably a requirement intended to suppress fraud. But
assuming that a policy must contain a provision to address the perceived threat of non
female identified women self-selecting into women's sport, I think that a continuity
requirement is far less objectionable that requiring external validation from medical or
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operated at the root of past policies around sex verification and transgender
participation. If women are to be subject to disqualification (a premise I will
later challenge), it is better that the reason be rooted in concerns about
fairness than because the athlete has not successfully proven that she is
female. This is because the latter rationale compounds the injury of being
excluded by additionally denying her the autonomous right to assert her own
gender. Third, the uniform hormone rule also represents a progressive step in
its removal of overly restrictive requirements for transgender athletes to
obtain surgery and to obtain legal recognition of their affirmed gender.
On the other hand, the inconsistent treatment of male-bodied people
proves to be a downside of the uniform hormone rule . As CAS noted in the
Chand decision, 16.5% of elite male athletes have endogenous testosterone
89
levels below 8 nmol/L. Having endorsed testosterone levels and a 10 nmol/L
cutoff as a determinant for eligibility for women's sport, the IOC and IAAF may
have difficulty persuading athletes and other stakeholders of the fairness of
exclude those men from the women's category. To be clear, the IOC's
proposed transgender policy does in fact distinguish transgender women from
men with low testosterone on entirely valid grounds given that the the former
but not the latter have a female gender identity. Yet it is harder to argue for
the relevancy of gender identity when the policy (by excluding female
identified with testosterone higher than 10 nmol/L) permits testosterone
levels to trump gender identity.
An additional drawback of the uniform hormone rule results from its
contribution to the stereotype of female athletic inferiority. Only female
athletes are protected against the alleged threat of testosterone-induced
advantage, and neither the IOC nor IAAF have even considered, let alone
proposed, a testosterone-based rule of exclusion for men's sport.
Furthermore, they fail to offer any explanation for why high-testosterone
women, but not men, pose a fairness threat to their respective competitors.
The rule's limited application to women's sports not only reduces the
credibility of the IOC and IAAF's claim that high levels of endogenous
90
testosterone is a threat to the fundamental fairness of sport, it also sends a
message that women are differently situated from men in terms of needing
protection from threat posed by the hormone associated with strength and
power. In this way, the rule puts female athletes in a double bind: the
professed justification for the rule is that testosterone is associated with
athleticism, yet testosterone is grounds for excluding the female athlete. By
legal sources. While the four-year continuity requirement would operate to exclude those
transgender women who have only recently come out, it may also provide reassurance to
younger athletes that they are not sacrificing Olympic dreams by coming out early in their
athletic careers.
Chand,
2014/A/37S9,
at
~
143,
http://www.tas
89.
cas.org/fi lead min/user_upload/award _internet. pdf.
90. CAMPORESt & MAUGERI, supra note SS, at S3; see also Heggie, supra note 13 ("For
men there is no equivalent upper physiological limit - no kind of genetic, or hormonal, or
physiological advantage is tested for, even if these would give a 'super masculine' athlete a
distinct advantage over the merely very athletic 'normal' male.").
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insisting on both, the rule constructs "female" and "athlete" as mutually
91
exclusive terms. Incidentally, U.S. courts would recognize this double bind as
a clear example of sex discrimination that is prohibited by law: An employer
who expects all employees to be aggressive in order to be promoted, but who
denies promotion to a female employee because aggressiveness in women is
transgressive, "places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch-22"
92
that is actionable sex discrimination under U.S. law. Of course U.S. law does
not constrain the IOC or IAAF, but it does provide an illustrative example of
how to conceptualize the relationship between sex discrimination and gender
stereotypes in ways that illustrate the discriminatory nature of the uniform
hormone rule.
Another downside to the uniform gender rule is the exclusion from
women's sports of some athletes whose undisputed gender identity is female.
Because a unified hormone rule still elevates another classification marker
(testosterone at higher or lower than 10 nmol/L) above gender identity, it
misses an opportunity to validate gender identity and to endorse the diversity
among those who are female by virtue of their female gender identity.
Human beings do not fall neatly into male and female categories that can be
objectively and conclusively determined by hormones or any other
physiological characteristic. Accordingly, the best and only fair way to
determine if someone is male or female is to ask them. Some governments
94
93
have adopted this approach, and some sport organizers have as well. A
uniform hormone rule misses an opportunity to adopt a policy that provides
stronger support to the concept of gender self-determination.
Relatedly, as long as the categories for participation are still called
"men's" and "women's," (rather than "above" and "below" 10 nmol/L) the
hormone standard will likely be interpreted as a proxy for sex verification. The
IOC may genuinely disavow the rule's application to determine who is really
female, but the public's and the athletes' perception will likely be otherwise.
After all, the classification marker at the heart of the uniform rule,
testosterone, is one that connotes "deeply entrenched social beliefs" about
95
gender.

91. PHILIPPE LIOTARD, From Apartheid to Segregation in Sports, in GENDER TESTING IN
SPORT, supra note 33, at 13, 23. The rule's endorsement of suspicion-based testing creates
other versions of the double bind as well. (Recall that Semenya's gender was called into
question in the first place, in part, because she ran too fast. Id., at 15.) Athletes are
measured by their success, but for women, success can lead to exclusion. Ergo, women
can't be athletes.
92. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 1791 (1989).
93. LAURENCE BRUNET & MURIEL SALLE, Categorizing and Attributing the Sex of Individuals,
in GENDER TESTING IN SPORT, supra note 33 at 60, 76 (noting that Denmark and Malta will
change an applicant's legal gender upon the submission of simple written request).
94. Erin Buzuvis, As Who They Really Are, LAw & INEQ. (forthcoming Dec. 2016)
(discussing gender-identity based policies in state high school athletic associations); see
also id. (discussing gender-identity based policy of the U.S Soccer Federation).
95. CAMPORESI & MAUGERI, supra note 55, at 53.
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Presumably, a unified hormone rule will only come to pass if the IAAF's
policy is reinstated by the CAS, upon a stronger scientific demonstration of the
relationship between testosterone and athletic ability. But even with this
potentially stronger scientific rationale, a unified hormone rule still
participates in the arbitrary selection of testosterone as the only natural
physical characteristic that justifies an advantage-based exclusion. It facilitates
the myth that a level playing field is something that sport can and should
construct, instead of acknowledging the reality that the diverse distribution of
physical characteristics (not to mention psychological, environmental, and
social ones) are essential to sport. That diversity is what makes sport
outcomes unpredictable and the contest itself worthwhile.
B. An End to Gender Categories?

In light of the above criticism, it makes sense to consider whether any
alternative rule could minimize reliance on gender stereotypes, maximize
inclusion, promote dignity and self-determination, and create realistic
expectations about playing-field fairness. Should we seek to eliminate gender
categories in sport? Or should we retain the separation with a dividing line
based on something other than hormones?
A suggestion to eliminate gender categories altogether is certainly
responsive to criticism that sorting individuals by hormone levels is an
imperfect proxy for gender and arbitrary criterion for leveling the playing field.
It also preempts arguments that athletes with natural athletic advantages
(such as high testosterone or a male body) must be excluded for the sake of a
"level playing field." The approach of eliminating gender categories would also
be inclusive of those individuals whose gender-identities are non-binary or
fluid.
Moreover, the separation of men's and women's sport itself contributes
to the stereotype of female athletic inferiority, since it denies women the
opportunity to compete and prove themselves in the presumably more
96
legitimate category.
Dismantling gender categories could address this
concern and permit female athletes to claim some of that legitimacy for
themselves.
But if eliminating the binary in sport is a strategy for challenging gender
stereotypes, it is one with great potential to backfire. A gender-neutral
approach to the Olympics would have a disparate impact on female athletes,
since it would reduce the number of women who make the national team or
qualify for events in individual sports and the number of female athletes who
97
win gold medals. Lacking critical mass, female athletes who do succeed on
96. See MCDONAGH & PAPPANO, supra note 31, at 15, 19-20, 23.
97. Compared to women, men tend to have more lean body mass, which contributes
to athletic performance. Men also have higher average weight and height, which are
advantageous in many sports. MCDONAGH & PAPPANO, supra note 31 at 52, 53. Female
athletes also tend to be disadvantaged by a society that does not assign as high a value to
their endeavors as it does to their male counterparts. This is not to say that women can
never compete successfully with men. See, e.g., Karkazis, supra note 29, at 8 (noting the
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gender-neutral terrain may be perceived as exceptional outliers whose
success does nothing to challenge stereotypes of women's athletic inferiority
98
Too few female champions may be interpreted not as an indictment
•
society's suppression of female athleticism-such as by limiting women's
opportunities and resources-but as evidence that women don't belong in
sport. For these reasons, a gender-less approach to sport may invite more
problems for female athletes than it solves.

C. A Uniform Gender Identity Rule
In light of the practical and pragmatic reasons for retaining gender
categories in sport, the IOC and sport federations should instead seek to
address criticism of the hormone rule by not by removing gender categories
but instead attempting to make the definitions of those categories as fair and
inclusive as possible. If (part of) the problem with a hormone rule is that
testosterone levels are an imperfect proxy for gender categories, one arguable
solution is to replace a uniform hormone rule with a uniform gender identity
rule. Under such an approach, all women-transgender women and cisgender
women, including those who are intersex-would be eligible for women's
sport so long as their gender identity is female, no exceptions. A gender ·
identity rule would permit intersex athletes like Dutee Chand, who would
otherwise be excluded under a hormone based rule, to participate in women's
sports based simply on the fact that their gender identity is incontrovertibly
female. Additionally, transgender women would be allowed to compete in
women's sports on the same grounds, and without any requirement to modify
their bodies.
The primary advantage of such a rule arises from its more realistic
treatment of gender. Instead of relying on a single determinant such as
hormones, a gender identity rule recognizes the reality that human beings'
gender is far too complex to be sorted on the basis of any physical
99
characteristic, as the history of the IOC's failed gender verification efforts has
100
The rule recognizes that gender identity is the most accurate
shown.
indicator of whether an individual is male or female, and validates the gender
identities of intersex and transgender women by providing for their inclusion
101
In this way, a gender-identity rule recognizes the
in women's sports.
fundamental right to self-determination, dignity and freedom endorsed by the

overlap in men's and women's times in seven of eight races at the 2009 World
Championships). But if these examples will be comparatively few, at least at the start, it is
realistic to consider the effect this will have on gender stereotypes about athleticism.
98. DEBORAH BRAKE, GETIING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S SPORTS REVOLUTION 26
(2010).
99. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2.
100. See Part I.A supra.
101. Dreger, supra note 24, at 24 (endorsing a gender identity approach while noting
that "we'd just learn to live with inevitable physiological variations among people raised as
girls.").
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102

international human rights community.
A policy of gender self-declaration
in sport is consistent with the approach some countries like Argentina and
Malta are taking to classify their citizens' gender for legal purposes. 103 It is,
moreover, consistent with the emerging definition of sex discrimination
increasingly asserted by the U.S. federal government; for example, the
Department of Education has concluded that singling out a transgender girl
from exclusion from facilities and activities that are open to other girls is a
104
violation of Title IX.
In a recent guidance letter, the Department of
Education and the Department of Justice jointly made clear schools receiving
federal funding must
permit students to participate in sex-segregated
programs (including athletics) according to their gender identities even where
that gender identity conflicts with the sex designation on their birth
105
certificates or other records.
The only requirement a transgender student
must satisfy to trigger the schools' obligaton to classify them according to
their gender identity rather than their birth-assiged sex is to provide notice to
school officials. No formal medical diagnosis or objective test is required. 106
But while a uniform gender identity rule offers certain advantages over a
uniform hormone rule, it suffers from some drawbacks as well. For one, it will
have to overcome the criticism that such a rule invites gender fraud because it
is easy in theory for a male athlete to gain access to women's sports cheat by
falsely asserting a female gender identity . To be clear, a gender identity rule
does not permit men who falsely assert that they are female to participate in
women's sport. It may, however, make it more difficult to detect such men.
Even a continuity requirement (i.e., requiring that the athlete has declared a
female identity consistently for the last four years, as IOC does now for
107
transgender women ) does little to stop the unlikely man who is determined,
or whose government is determined, to exploit a gender identity rule. Still,
however, sport federations would not be powerless to investigate and
adjudicate such fraud in a hearing to determine the credibility of the athlete's
disputed gender identity determination. Rather than medical evidence, the

102. E.g.,
Yogyakarta
Principles,
available
at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/backgrounder_en.pdf.
103. Brunet & Salle, supra note 93, at 76.
104. Letter from Dep't of Ed. Office for Civil Rights Reg'I Dir. Adele Rapport to Robert
Cates, OCR 05-14-1055 (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press
re Ieases/townsh ip-h igh-211-letter. pdf
105. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LEITER ON TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS,
(May
13,
2016),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-ti tle-ix
transgender.pdf.
106. Id. Because the guidance is directed at the rights of students, it contemplates
such notice being provided by the student's parents.
107. Erin Buzuvis, Caster Semenya and the Myth of the Level Playing Field, 6 THE
MODERN AMERICAN 36 (2010); Jennifer Finney Boylan, The XY Games, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug.
3, 2008 (The best judge of a person's gender is not a degrading, questionable examination.
The best judge of a person's gender is what lies within his, or her heart....A quick look at
the reality of an athlete's life ought to settle the question.").
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adjudicator would rely on testimony from the athlete and those vouching for
the athlete's credibility, as well as testimony from witnesses to any Herman
108
Ratjen -like conspiracy.
Critics will also likely attack a uniform gender identity rule by arguing that
transgender women and hyperandrogenic women upset the level playing field
in women's sports. Many female athletes, for example, vocally criticize the
109
as
participation by intersex athletes like Dutee Chand and Caster Semenya,
well as transgender female athletes whose bodies suppress or no longer
110
produce testosterone as a result of pharmacological or surgical transition.
Given that a theoretical gender identity rule would permit transgender
women to compete even without having physically transitioned-e.g., it
would permit Caitlyn Jenner to compete in women's sports while she still has
the body and physique of Bruce-one would anticipate female athletes'
objections to a theoretical gender identity rule to be even stronger.
Anticipated criticism notwithstanding, the IOC and sport federations
could choose to lead, rather than follow, public opinion on transgender and
intersex athletes. The prevailing belief that participation in women's sport
must be regulated in the name of fairness exists because sport organizers have
always regulated women's sports in the name of fairness. If sport organizers
endorsed a different fairness paradigm that was more tolerant of diversity
within gender categories, public opinion could shift as a result. After all, there
111
That said,
is no denying the powerful influence of sport on cultural values.
there is little evidence to suggest that the IOC and other sport federations are
motivated to lead a shift in cultural paradigms of fairness and gender. For this
reason, a gender identity rule may not be realistically achievable, and
advocates for an alternative to the hormone rule might be better served
advancing some other approach instead.
Finally, while a uniform gender identity rule would permit transgender
women to compete as women, it could likely limit the participation of pre
transition transgender men who wish to participate in women's sports
112
While there are certainly examples
consistent with their birth-assigned sex.
108. See infra Part I.A.
109. E.g., Chand, 2014/A/3759, 334-340 (noting athletes' support for IAAF's
exclusion of Chand and disappointment in the IAAF's decision permitting Semenya to
compete).
110. Cavanagh & Sykes, supra note at_, at 76 (noting female cyclists objection and
protest to the participation of transgender female competitor Michelle Dumaresq); UFC
Women's Champ Refuses to Fight Trans Athlete Fallon Fox, Advocate, Nov. 22, 2014,
available at http://www.advocate.com/sports/2014/09/22/ufc-womens-champ-ref uses
fight-trans-athlete-fallon-fox (noting a female athlete's objection to fighting a transgender
woman at mixed-martial arts).
111. E.g., McDonagh & Papano, supra note 31, at 1-3 ("sports matter").
112. Some transgender men have decided not to transition with cross-sex hormones
and have continued to participate in women's sports while using male name and pronouns
and adopting other aspects of masculine expression. See Sam Borden, Trans Athlete Fails
at
available
2012,
21,
June
Qualify,
to
http://london2012.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/transgender-athlet e-fails-to
qualify/?_r=O (describing transgender male Keelin Godsey's efforts to qualify for women's
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of transgender men who seek to participate in men's sports,
th.=re are
compelling reasons to respect the preference of other transgender men to
compete with women. For example, a transgender man may by virtue of his
female body and birth assignment have been raised as female, a designation
that influenced - and likely limited - his athletic opportunities. Certain
cultures channel female athleticism into different sports (softball versus
114
baseball, for example) or suppress it altogether by prioritizing men's sports.
These differences contribute to the generalized gender differences in
115
athleticism, especially for aspects of athleticism which research suggests are
learned skills, not innate talents, such as motor skills, coordination, and
116
For these reasons, it is unfair to exclude a transgender man from
form.
women's sports simply because his gender identity is not female. This
conclusion is notably reflected in the policy of the NCAA, which permits
transgender men to participate in women's sports as long as they have not
117
started taking testosterone.
A uniform gender-identity policy would put transgender men at risk of
exclusion from women's sports, or suppress their expressions of masculinity
that could invoke a challenge to their gender identity. To transgender men, a
gender-identity rule would arguably be more restrictive than the IOC's
proposed transgender policy, which does not address (and given a default

hammer throw); Katie Thomas, Transgender Man Is on Women's Team, NY TIMES, Nov. 10,
available
at
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/sports/ncaabasketball/02gender.html.
113. See Cyd Zeigler, Exclusive: Read the Olympics' New Transgender Policy That Will
Not
Mandate
Surgery,
at
OUTSPORTS,
Jan.
21,
2016,
available
at
http://www.outsports.com/2016/1/21/10812404/transgender-ioc-policy-new-olympics
(describing the efforts of transgender male athlete Chris Mosier to qualify for men's
duathlon); see also http://www.cbsnews.com/news/transgender-harvard-swimmer-says
he-made-the-right-choice/ (describing NCAA transgender male swimmer who competes on
men's team).
114. DON SABO, PHIL VELIZ, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND'N, Go OUT AND PLAY: YOUTH SPORTS IN
AMERICA 70-71 (2008), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED539976.pdf; see also Buzuvis,
supra note 107 at 38 ("When it comes to sport, men and boys have enjoyed centuries of
preferential treatment, including encouragement, validation, opportunity, and incentive,
not to mention the tailoring of sport to suit men's physical and socially-constructed
characteristics.").
115. Buzuvis, supra note 107 at 37-38.
116. COLLETTE DOWLING, FRAILTY MYTH: REDEFINING THE PHYSICAL POTENTIAL OF WOMEN AND
GIRLS 62 (Random House 2001). For example, according to one study, second-grade boys
and girls threw at the same speed with their nondominant arms, suggesting that practice,
rather than innate biological traits, produced boys' superior speed in dominant-arm throws.
Id. at 65 ((citing Kathleen Williams et al., Environmental Versus Biological Influences on

Gender Differences in Overarm Throw for Force: Dominant and Nondominant Arm Throws,
5 WOMEN SPORT & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY J. 29, 42 (1996)).
117. NATL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES 8
(2011), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/111 NCL. pdf.
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presumption of birth-sex eligibility, appears to permit) whether transgender
118
men may compete in women's sports prior to transition.
D. A Hybrid Approach

Another alternative to a uniform hormone rule is a hybrid approach that
subjects only transgender athletes to a hormone rule, and imposes a gender
identity rule on nontransgender athletes whose gender may challenged for
reasons (such as hyperandrogenism) related to an intersex condition. Such a
rule would permit the participation in women's sports of athletes like Dutee
Chand (by virtue of their gender identity), but would exclude transgender
women who have not undergone hormone treatment to bring their
testosterone level below the "normal male range" cutoff of 10 nmol/L. A
hybrid rule that imposes a hormone rule on transgender athletes moreover
provides a basis for permitting non-transitioned transgender (i.e., those who
have not elevated their testosterone levels to the "normal male range") to
continue to compete in women's sports.
The obvious downside to such a rule is its admitted internal
119
A hybrid rule says to intersex women, "your gender identity
inconsistency.
matters more than your hormones," but says to transgender women, "your
hormones matter more than your gender identity." Rationalizing this
inconsistency risks undermining transgender women by opening the door to
arguments that the reason to treat them differently arises from the fact that
they are not real women, or that they are not"female from birth" (as
hyperandrogenic women are). The hybrid rule is unable to account for the
fact that a transgender woman is a real woman, even "from birth" by virtue of
120
having been "born with" a female gender identity.
Additionally, rationalizing a hybrid rule could generate support for the
mythologized "level playing field" criticized earlier in this Article. For instance,
118. IOC Policy, supra note 46. Under a theoretical gender-identity rule, anti-doping
rules could still restrict transgender men from receiving hormone treatments while
participating in women's sports. Such a policy would be a natural extension of therapeutic
use exception for testosterone that applies to men's and not women's sports. The World
Anti-Doping Agency considers transgender men eligible for a testosterone TUE because the
exception is available to other men with low testosterone. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY,
TUE PHYSICIANS GUIDELINES: FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUAL ATHLETES (Mar. 2016), available at
https://www.usada.org/wp-content/ uploads/TUE-guidance-female-to-m ale-transexual
athletes.pdf. There is no existing rationale for extending the TUE to transgender men who
want to continue to compete in women's sports.
119. To the extent the downside of the hybrid rule is internal inconsistency, it is no
more internally inconsistent than the unified hormone rule as presently contemplated by
the IOC and IAAF, which singles out men with testosterone levels below 10 nmols/L to be
governed by their gender identity, when everyone else is classified according to their
hormone levels. This demonstrates that the apparently-consistent rule IOC/IAAF advances
is actually already a hybrid rule.
120. See, e.g., M. Dru Levasseur, Esq., Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law
to Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 951
(2015) (explaining and providing medical support for gender identity's "strong biological
and genetic component").
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one could rationalize excluding transgender women from the gender-identity
rule with evidence (if such evidence existed) that the athletic advantage of a
non-transitioned transgender woman over other women is greater than the
athletic advantage of a hyperandrogenic woman over other women.
However, advancing this theoretical finding as a basis for different treatment
encourages the fictionalized notion that fairness requires attention to isolated
and arbitrary gender-based differences.
Yet it may be possible to support the hybrid rule in a way that avoids
undermining transgender women and trading in the discourse of "level playing
field." A viable explanation for the different treatment between non
transitioned transgender women and all other women under the proposed
hybrid rule is rooted in reliance theory. Reliance is the legal principle that says
in some circumstances, one's rights are determined by the fact that one has
been exercising those rights for a long time on the reasonable assumption that
121
those rights were secure.
When this principle applies, 122 courts allow one
party's reliance interest to tip the scale in their favor out of concern that the
degree of loss is higher for the party being asked to give up existing rights than
for the party foreclosed from accessing new rights. 123 Under this theory, some
may argue that non-transitioned transgender women have maintained a
weaker reliance interest in participating in women's sports relative to the
women who are included under the rule. Further, a hybrid rule that excludes
participation of non-transitioned transgender women while permitting the
participation of hyperandrogenic women may be justified on the grounds that
hyperandrogenic women have an stronger reliance interest in participating as
women because they already do so, usually under circumstances that have not
called that right into question. Dutee Chand, for example, has participated in
women's sports all her life. She had never doubted her eligibility for women's
sports, and did not learn that she was hyperandrogenic until she was tested by
her NGB. A decision to exclude Dutee Chand from sport at this point would be
very costly to her because she has devoted her life to a career with the
expectation that this right, her eligibility, will continue. As illustrated by Dutee
Chand, hyperandrogenic women are differently situated than non-transitioned
transgender women since non-transitioned transgender women are more
likely to have invested their athletic talent in men's sports in the absence of
available opportunities to compete as women. lntersex women's particularly
strong reliance interest in being categorized as a woman justifies applying a
121. For example, in property law, the doctrine of adverse possession operates to
award title to someone who has been in mistaken (or even intentional) possession of
property that they do not truly own, out of recognition for the possessing party's
expectation in continued possession, an expectation that strengthens over time. Joseph
William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 666 (1988).
122. Id. at 666-67.
123. Assigning higher value to one person's continued exercise an existing right than
to another equally worthy person's newly-granted right is consistent with, and perhaps
explained by an observation by behavioral economists that people prefer to forego gain
than to sustain equivalent losses (loss aversion theory). Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy
Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2460 (2001).
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gender identity rule to them even if a uniform gender identity rule proves
unacceptable.
Additionally, considering reliance interest provides a justification for
refraining from using gender identity as criteria to exclude genderqueer and
non-transitioned transgender men from women's sports. These athletes, like
hyperandrogenic women (and unlike non-transitioned transgender men) have
relied on sport's classification of them as female and have cultivated their
athletic interests and talents accordingly.
To be clear, this explanation assumes that the IOC is unlikely to adopt a
rule that would be inclusive of a transgender woman who has not transitioned
with hormones. It is important that a second-best scenario not contribute to
The reliance
the further marginalization of those who are excluded.
distinction proposed here is operating to prevent a more harmful
rationalization-namely, a rationalization that casts transgender women as
less female- from taking its place.
A hybrid rule maximizes inclusion while maintaining realistic expectations
of what may be achieved at Olympic and world-class levels of sport. When the
rationale for excluding non-transitioned transgender women is carefully
explained, the rule minimizes the extent to which eligibility requirements for
women's sport contributes to harmful gender stereotypes, and avoids
conceding to the fiction that a level playing field can constructed by excluding
some who self-identify as women. If the CAS were to decide not to reinstate
the hyperandrogenism rule, the rationale provided here helps explain why
sport federations should still adopt the IOC's proposed hormone rule for
transgender athletes.
CONCLUSION

In modern times, sport has struggled to impose a binary division on
human beings who are not so easily sorted. The IOC and IAAF have attempted
to determine who is eligible for women's sports by visual inspection, by
chromosome testing, by standardless suspicion-based testing, and by a
hyperandrogenism rule-efforts that have humiliated and undermined female
athletes, strengthened stereotypes of female athleticism, and perpetuated the
myth of the level playing field. At the same time, they have subjected
transgender athletes to a triad of requirements that failed to contemplate
transgender men, and that operated to exclude more transgender women
than is supported by rule's purported rationale.
If the hyperandrogenism rule clears the hurdle erected by the Court of
Arbitration for sport, the IOC will have a clearer path to promote the
extension of a hormone-based rule to govern transgender athletes as well as
intersex women. While a uniform hormone rule offers certain advantages,
especially as compared to past efforts, the rule promises to exclude from
women sports some transgender and nontransgender women whose status
as female is beyond dispute. Such exclusion is unnecessary to maintain
fairness in women's sport, as women come in diverse shapes and sizes with
diverse combinations of natural advantages. Instead, the IOC should promote
gender-identity based participation for nontransgender women. In explaining
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why transgender athletes should instead be governed by a hormone standard
that excludes nontransitioned transgender women from women's sports (but
permits untransitioned transgender men and transitioned transgender
women), it should articulate a rationale (such as reliance) that minimizes the
potential of a hybrid rule to undermine the gender identities of transgender
women and set unrealistic expectations about a level playing field.

